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Abstract
Following the original interpretation of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953a) as a priori eval-
uation of the prospects of a player in a multi-person interaction situation, we propose a group
value, which we call the Shapley group value, as a priori evaluation of the prospects of a group
of players in a coalitional game when acting as a unit. We study its properties and we give an
axiomatic characterization. Relaying on this valuation we analyze the profitability of a group.
We motivate our proposal by means of some relevant applications of the Shapley group value,
when it is used as an objective function by a decisionmaker who is trying to identify an optimal
group of agents in a framework in which agents interact and the attained benefit can be mod-
eled by means of a transferable utility game. As an illustrative example we analyze the problem
of identifying the set of key agents in a terrorist network.
Keywords: Game Theory, TU games, Shapley value, group values.
1 Introduction
One of the most important one-point solution concepts in the framework of coalitional games
with side payments is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953a), which proposes an allocation of re-
sources in multiperson interactions taking into account the power of players in their various co-
operation opportunities. Since the pioneering work of Lloyd S. Shapley, many different values
have been proposed, as for example the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969); the τ-value (Tijs, 1981) or
the least square values (Ruiz, Valenciano and Zarzuelo, 1998). There is also a vast literature fo-
cused on extensions, modifications and generalizations of the Shapley value: weighted Shapley
values (Shapley, 1953b); semi-values (Dubey, Neyman andWeber, 1981); the value for large games
∗This research has been supported by I+D+i research project MTM2011-27892 from the Government of Spain.
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(Aumann and Shapley, 1974); values for NTU games which generalize the Nash bargaining so-
lution (Nash, 1950) and the Shapley value (Harsanyi, 1963; Shapley, 1969; Maschler and Owen,
1992); theMyerson value for games with graph restricted communication (Myerson, 1977), values
for games with coalition structures (Aumann and Dre`ze, 1974; Owen, 1977; Hart and Kurz, 1983),
and others.
In this paper, we propose an extension of the Shapley value inspired in the question originally
addressed by Shapley in his seminal paper (see Hart 1987): How would one evaluate the prospects
of a player in a multiperson interaction, that is, in a game? Following this interpretation, we pro-
pose a group value as a priori evaluation of the prospects of a group of players in a multi-person
game when acting as a group, which takes into account the power of groups in their various co-
operation opportunities without imposing on the other agents any concrete coalition structure.
Mathematically, our proposal is related with the Shapley value of certain quotient games (Owen,
1977), also called merging games by Derks and Tijs (2000), which capture the situation when all
the members of a group commit themselves to bargain with the others as a unit. It is remarkable
however that they do not deal with the problem of assigning values to groups.
A key observation in our proposal is that we do not need to suppose necessarily that the
players know each other nor agree to act jointly; instead, we assume the existence of an external
agent, the decision maker, that is able to coordinate the actions of the members of the group. This
is the case for instance of terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda, or secret societies; in which there
exists a leader (or a set of leaders) who sends a common signal that all the agents in the group
are willing to follow. In this work we describe alternative situations in which this type of external
coordination occurs.
Following Roth (1977), the ultimate aim of our proposal is to serve as an utility function for
a decision maker who is trying to find an optimal group under certain conditions - for instance,
of a given size- in those situations in which agents are immersed in a cooperative game. To be
specific, we illustrate its applicability in three different settings which share two relevant features:
(i) the objective is the selection of an optimal group, rather than the best individual; and (ii) the
performance of a group depends on its interaction with the rest of agents. In this context, to
maximize the characteristic function entails a too restrictive assumption over the rest of agent’s
behavior, i.e., only one scenario (mainly, the worst one) is evaluated. On the contrary, we show
that maximizing the value of a group allows us to consider a more general setting, in which more
than one scenario concerning other agents’ actions is taken into account.
Section 2 is devoted to a general presentation of the problem we deal with. We first introduce
some standard concepts and notation on Game Theory that will be used throughout this paper,
and then we describe three different cases in which the need for a group valuation arises. In
Section 3 we introduce the notion of group value and we define our proposal, which we call the
Shapley group value. We give an axiomatic characterization for it and we analyze its properties.
In Section 4 we analyze the profitability of a group by means of comparing its valuation as a
group with the sum of its members’ individual Shapley values. In Section 5 we explore one of its
potential applications previously considered in Section 2. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Acknowledgements.Wewould like towarmly thank Javier Castro (UniversidadComplutense
de Madrid) for the simulation program used to obtain the numerical results in Section 5.
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2 Motivation and notation
A cooperative game in coalitional form with side payments, or with transferable utility, is an
ordered pair (N, v), where N is a finite set of players and v : 2N → IR, with 2N = {S | S ⊂ N}, is
a characteristic function on N satisfying v(∅) = 0. For any coalition S ⊂ N, v(S) ∈ IR is the worth
of coalition S and represents the reward that coalition S can achieve by itself if all its members act
together. Since we will restrict to the case of TU games in the sequel, we will refer to them simply
as games. For brevity, throughout the paper, the cardinality of sets (coalitions) N, S and C will be
denoted by appropriate small letters n, s and c, respectively. Also, for notational convenience, we
will write singleton {i} as i, when no ambiguity appears.
Let U = {1, 2, . . . } be the universe of players, and let N be the class of all non-empty finite
subsets of U . For an element N inN , let GN denote the set of all characteristic functions on player
set N, and let G =
⋃
N∈N
GN be the set of all characteristic functions.
1 A value ϕ is an assignation
which associates to each game v ∈ GN , N ∈ N , a real vector ϕ(N, v) = (ϕi(N, v))i∈N ∈ R
N ,
where ϕi(N, v) ∈ R represents the value of player i, i ∈ N. Shapley (1953a) defines his value as
follows:
φi(N, v) = ∑
S⊂N\i
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
(
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)
)
, i ∈ N. (1)
The value φi(N, v) of each player, which is a weighted average of his marginal contributions, ad-
mits different interpretations, such as the payoff that player i receives when the Shapley value is
used to predict the allocation of resources in multiperson interactions, or his power when aver-
ages are used to aggregate the power of players in their various cooperation opportunities. As
announced in the introduction, our proposal for measuring the value of a group is based on the
question originally addressed by Shapley in his seminal paper: we interpret the value as the ex-
pectations of a player (group) in a game (N, v). In other words, φi(N, v) ∈ R is an a priori value
that measures the prospects of player i ∈ N in the game v ∈ GN , and can be used as an objective
function for selecting key players.2 The approach just discussed is undertaken in the next three
cases, already considered in the literature:
(i) In Lindelauf, Hamers andHusslage (2013), the authors introduce a game-theoretic approach
to identify the key players in a terrorist network. They considered four different weighted
extensions of the connectivity game (Amer and Gimenez, 2004) to capture the structure of the
terrorist organization as well as additional individual information about the terrorists, and
then they proposed to calculate the Shapley value of each game in order to identify the key
players. In Section 5, where we analyze in detail this application, we recover the formal
definitions of those games.
(ii) In Narayanam and Narahari (2011), the authors also introduce a game-theoretic approach
to address the target set selection problem in the framework of diffusion of information. They
consider the linear threshold model (Schelling (1971), Granovetter (1978), and Kempe, Klein-
1We will use interchangeably the two terminologies, game and characteristic function, when no ambiguity appears.
2Note that in general v(i) 6= φi(N, v).
3
berg and Tardos (2005)) to model the role of the social structure in the sharing of information
and the formation of opinions dynamics. The propagation process in this case is character-
ized by a set of agents N, which are connected through a social network. The flow of avail-
able information is captured by aweight matrixW whose entries are understood as influence
weights; in particular, wij quantifies the weight that agent i assigns to agent j. It is assumed
that these weights are normalized in such a way that ∑j∈Ni wij ≤ 1, where Ni represents the
set of neighbors of agent i, for all i ∈ N. In this model, it is also assumed that each agent
has two possible states: active, if he has adopted the information that is being propagated,
and inactive otherwise. From a dynamic point of view, it is assumed that the status of the
agents may change as time goes by. At each date, agents communicate with their neighbors
in the social network and update their state. The updating process is simple: all agents that
were active in step (t− 1) remain active at step t; and every inactive agent at step (t− 1)
becomes active if the sum of the weights of his active neighbors’ from the previous period
is at least θi, a threshold which represents the weighted fraction of the neighbors of i that
must become active in order to activate agent i.
The authors define a game (N, v), where the value of coalition S is defined to be the expected
number of active nodes at the end of the diffusion process when initially all agents in S are
active, whereas all agents in N \ S are inactive, and assuming all thresholds θi are chosen
uniformly at random from the interval [0, 1] initially. Then, they propose to calculate the
Shapley value of the game in order to rank the agents. Taking into account that the k agents
with highest Shapley value are not in general the optimal set of k agents, they propose
an heuristic procedure, based on the Shapley value of each agent and the social network
structure, to select the key set of k agents.
(iii) In Conklin, Powaga and Lipovetski (2004) the authors introduce a game-theoretic approach
for the identification of sets of key drivers in customer satisfaction analysis, on the basis of
Kano’s theory (Kano et al., 1984) of the relationship between product quality and customer
satisfaction, and the information given by a random sample of customers. The attributes
take the role of the players, and the characteristic function of the game measures the ability
of every group of attributes to predict the dissatisfaction level of customers. To be specific,
v(S) = P{∑
i∈S
Mi > 0 /D = 1}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
reach
− P{∑
i∈S
Mi > 0 /D = 0}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
noise
,
where Mi ∈ {0, 1} takes the value 1 if attribute i has failed, and 0 otherwise; and D ∈ {0, 1}
reflects the overall dissatisfaction (D = 1) with the product. The above probabilities are es-
timated through the opinions of a random sample of customers as proportions of the failed
within those who are dissatisfied (reach) and non-dissatisfied (noise). Then, the authors pro-
pose to use the Shapley value for ordering the attributes. Then, they add attributes to the list
of key dissatisfiers following that order until a point where the added noise overwhelms the
added reach. This problem is in fact a particular instance of a multicriteria decision prob-
lem, in which the aim is to rank or score alternatives according to several (often conflicting)
points of view, called criteria (see Grabisch et al., 2002). In this context Pinte´r (2011) uses the
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Shapley value for selecting the predictors in a linear regression model.
Note that in the examples considered above, there exists in fact an external decision maker who
is interested in finding an optimal group of agents, rather that an optimal agent:
(i) In the first example the police wants to identify a small group of terrorists to neutralize
in order to break up the criminal organization. Or, it could be the case, that they were
interested in selecting a small group of criminals to mislead in order to optimally diffuse
their own information through the network (by using them as seed). In the first case, the
goal could be to find the group of terrorists of a given size 1 ≤ k < n whose removing turns
into a maximum reduction of the criminal activity. In the second case, the goal could be to
find a group of minimum size that achieves a given percentage of information spreading.
In both cases, the police needs an objective functionwhich evaluates the a priori performance
of every group in each of the two settings.
(ii) In the target set selection problem of example two, the goal is to find a set of k key agents that
wouldmaximize the spreading of information through the network. Thus, we need again an
objective function which measures the a priori ability of each group to spread information.
(iii) In Conklin, Powaga and Lipovetski (2004), where the authors’ goal is the identification of
sets of k key drivers in customer satisfaction analysis, the need for a objective function which
gives a priori valuation of each group of attributes to predict the dissatisfaction level of
customers is also clear. Again the problem is to find the group of k drivers which maximizes
this objective function.
It must also be remarked that, analogously to what happens for the individual case, in which
v(i) is not a proper valuation of the performance of player i ∈ N in the game, a direct use of
v(S) to measure the a priori value of group S is not in general the best approach to solve this
problem. For instance, to maximize v(·) in the second example implies a pessimistic scenario in
which none of the agents out of coalition S whose diffusion power is being evaluated adopts the
product spontaneously. The same argument remains valid for the other two situations considered
above.
Thus, since measuring the expected value of a group is a relevant question, and taking into
account that the kmore valuable agents (from the individual point of view) do not form in general
the most valuable group of k agents, the need for a specific group valuation is clear.
3 The Shapley group value: definition and axiomatic characteri-
zation
We aim to define an appropriate group valuation which can be used as an utility function for an
external decision agentwho is trying to select a group of players according to some specified goal. In
this section we define our proposal, we study its properties and we characterize it axiomatically.
In this setting, a group value ξg is a mapping that to any non-empty and finite player set N ∈ N ,
any game v ∈ GN , and any group C with C ⊂ N ∈ N , associates a real number ξ
g(C;N, v),
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satisfying ξg(∅;N, v) = 0. ξg(C;N, v) ∈ IR is the value of group C and measures the prospects of
group C in v when players in C act as a unit.
The properties of a characteristic function hold for ξg(·;N, v), but the interpretation we give of
every value ξg(C;N, v), C ⊂ N, does not coincide with the usual interpretation of the worth v(C)
of coalition C in a game v ∈ GN . As it happens in the case of the Shapley value of the game, the
group value of a game determines a different utility function for games which is, in words of Roth
(1977), “compatible with the existing utility function that defines the game”. In fact, following
the Shapley value approach, we propose to evaluate the performance of a group averaging its
marginal contribution over all possible scenarios. Going back to example two, when evaluating
the diffusion power of group S we take into account all feasible scenarios in which some of the
remaining agents adopt the product spontaneously.
First, in order to define our proposal we must consider what group integration means for the
applications we have in mind. In this framework, group integration does not necessarily imply
that agents in C make an agreement to act jointly. For instance, going back to the diffusion of
information case, there exists a external agent who can activate the nodes that are used as seeds
to diffuse the innovation through the network, and the activated nodes are not in general aware
about the other selected seeds’ identities. The same occurs when the police selects a group of
terrorists to turn back into double agents, or to misinform in order to spread their misinformation
through the criminal organization network. Therefore, when measuring group C’s expectations
we will evaluate them like a unit anyway, and we will adopt the merging of players approach of
Derks and Tijs (2000), who analyze the profitability of group formation in a more general setting
(but not, as said above, the problem of assigning values to groups). In that case all the agents of
C are replaced by a single player c, who can act as a proxy of any agent in C.
Formally, let v ∈ GN , and let C ⊂ N ∈ N be any non-empty coalition. Now, let us consider
the so called C-partition, denoted by PC, consisting of the compartments C and the one-person
coalitions of players outside C. Then, the merging game with respect to PC is the (n − c + 1)-
person cooperative game (NC, vC), where the agent set NC = (N \ C) ∪ {c} with c as a single
proxy player c ≡ C, and vC is of the form:
vC(S) =


v(S), if c /∈ S,
v(S ∪ C) if c ∈ S,
∀ S ⊂ NC. (2)
Definition 1. The Shapley group value is the group value that assigns for every v ∈ GN , N ∈ N ,
the valuation mapping φg(·;N, v) given by:
φg(C;N, v) = φc(NC, vC), for each group ∅ 6= C ⊂ N,
where (NC, vC) is the merging game with respect to C.
Since each φg(C;N, v) is obtained by applying the Shapley value to a merging game, it is
remarkable (and somewhat obvious) that for every coalition with at least two players the corre-
sponding merging game is different. One-person coalitions C1 = {i} and C2 = {j} are the unique
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cases in which the two merging games, (NC1 , vC1) and (NC2 , vC2), are the same for two different
groups C1 and C2. Trivially these two merging games coincide with (N, v).
Our goal is to find an axiomatic characterization of the defined Shapley group value. We first
propose and analyze some relevant properties of a group value, which extend to this setting the
main properties involved in the many axiomatic approaches provided for the Shapley value.
We first recall some definitions. A game (N, v) is a unanimity game if there exists a coalition
S ⊂ N such that for every T ⊂ N, v(T) = 1 if S ⊂ T, and v(T) = 0 otherwise. In this case,
the game is usually denoted by (N, uS). Unanimity games are a basis of the vector space GN
of all games with the player set N. Also recall that given v ∈ GN , i ∈ N is a dummy player if
v(S∪ i) = v(S) + v(i) for all S ⊂ N. A dummy player with v(i) = 0 is said to be a null player in v.
A game v ∈ GN is monotonic if v(T) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N.
Properties
Let ξg be a group value defined over the set of all games G. Then, ξg verifies:
(P1) G-coherence, if ∑i∈N ξ
g(i;N, v) = ξg(N;N, v) for all N ∈ N and v ∈ GN ;
(P2) G-dummy player, if ξg(C ∪ i;N, v) = ξg(C;N, v) + v(i) for all C ( N ∈ N , i ∈ N \ C and
v ∈ GN , whenever i is a dummy player;
(P3) G-null player, if ξg(C ∪ i;N, v) = ξg(C;N, v) for all C ( N ∈ N , i ∈ N \ C and v ∈ GN ,
whenever i is a null player;
(P4) G-anonymity, if for all C ⊂ N ∈ N and for all permutations pi of the player set N, ξg(pi(C);pi(N),piv) =
ξg(C;N, v), where piv(S) := v(pi(S)), and being pi(S) = {pi(i) |i ∈ S};
(P5) G-linearity, if ξg(C;N, α1v + α2w) = α1ξ
g(C;N, v) + α2ξ
g(C;N,w) for all C ⊂ N ∈ N ,
α1, α2 ∈ R, and games v,w ∈ GN , where α1v + α2w ∈ GN is given by (α1v + α2w)(S) =
α1v(S) + α2w(S) for all S ⊂ N;
(P6) G-coalitional balanced contributions (or G-CBC for short), if for all C ( N ∈ N , i, j ∈ N \C and
v ∈ GN , we have
(ξg(C ∪ i;N, v)− ξg(C;N, v))− (ξg(C ∪ i;N\j, v−j)− ξ
g(C;N\j, v−j)) =
(ξg(C ∪ j;N, v)− ξg(C;N, v))− (ξg(C ∪ j;N\i, v−i)− ξ
g(C;N\i, v−i)), (3)
where v−i ∈ GN\i stands for the restriction of the characteristic function v to the set of players
N\i;
(P7) G-symmetry over pure bargaining games (or G-SPB for short), if ξg(C;N, uN) =
1
n−c+1 for each
non-empty C ⊂ N ∈ N , where (N, uN) is the unanimity game with respect to the grand
coalition;
(P8) G-coalitional monotonicity, if ξg(C;N, v) ≤ ξg(C;N,w) for all C ⊂ T ⊂ N ∈ N and for all
games v,w ∈ GN such that v(S) = w(S) for all S 6= T and v(T) < w(T);
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(P9) G-strong monotonicity, if ξg(C;N, v) ≤ ξg(C;N,w) for all C ⊂ N ∈ N , and for all games
v,w ∈ GN for which v(S ∪ C)− v(S) ≤ w(S ∪ C)−w(S) for all S ⊂ N \ C.
(P10) G-positivity, if ξg(C;N, v) ≥ 0 for all C ⊂ N ∈ N and any monotonic game v ∈ GN ;
(P11) G-relative invariance with respect to strategic equivalence, if ξg(C;N,w) = aξg(C;N, v)+ ∑i∈S bi
for all C ⊂ N ∈ N , v ∈ GN , a > 0 and b ∈ R
n, where w ∈ GN is given by w(S) =
av(S) + ∑i∈S bi for all S ⊂ N;
(P12) G-coalitional strategic equivalence, if ξg(C;N, v) = ξg(C;N, v + λuT) for all C ( N ∈ N ,
∅ 6= T ⊂ N \ C, λ ∈ R and v ∈ GN ;
(P13) G-fair ranking, if for all T ⊂ N ∈ N and every pair of games v,w ∈ GN such that v(S) =
w(S) for all S 6= T, ξg(C1;N, v) > ξ
g(C2;N, v) implies ξ
g(C1;N,w) > ξ
g(C2;N,w) for all
C1,C2 ⊂ T with |C1| = |C2|.
Regarding the fact that (N, ξg(·;N, v)) could be formally considered a game in GN , some of
the previous properties can be interpreted in terms of games. For instance, properties P2 and P3
can be restated as “if i is a dummy (null) player in (N, v), then it is a dummy (null) player in
(N, ξg(·;N, v))”.
G-coherence is inspired in the coherence property considered by Calvo and Gutie´rrez (2010)
in the setting of games with coalition structures. Coherence, which was called coalitional structure
equivalence in Albizuri (2008) (see also Hart and Kurz, 1983), requires the value to give the same
both when all the players are joined and when nobody is joined.
G-dummy, G-null, G-anonymity, G-linearity, and G-relative invariance with respect to strate-
gic equivalence generalize their counterparts for individual values for general games. Note that
linearity of the group value is closely related to the following property, which is consistent with
the interpretation of the group value as the expected utility of playing a game: “the group value
of a probabilistic mixture of two games (i.e., with probability p the game v is played, and with
probability p′ = 1− p, the game w is played) is the same mixture of the group values of the two
games” (Hart and Kurz, 1983).
G-coalitional strategic equivalence, which generalizes G-relative invariance with respect to
strategic equivalence to coalitions T ⊂ N with |T| ≥ 2, adapts the same property of individual
values, introduced by Chun (1989) to characterize the Shapley value by adding triviality (the
value of a null game is the null vector), efficiency and fair ranking -also defined by Chun (1989),
and that can be generalized to G-fair ranking-.
G-coalitional monotonicity and G-strong monotonicity generalize the corresponding mono-
tonicity properties considered by Young (1985), who characterizes the Shapley value by means of
efficiency, symmetry and strong monotonicity. Moreover, G-positivity extends positivity, intro-
duced by Kalai and Samet (1987).
G-coalitional balanced contributions, which together with G-symmetry over pure bargaining
games, plays a crucial role in the axiomatic characterization of the Shapley group value, general-
izes the balanced contribution property which adding efficiency characterizes the Shapley value
(Myerson, 1977). G-CBC states that for any group C ⊂ N \ {i, j}, the impact of player j’s presence
over the marginal contribution of player i to the value of group C equals the impact of player i’s
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presence over the marginal contribution of player j to the value of the same group C. This idea
generalizes the original balanced contribution property of Myerson: “. . . that player i contribute to
player j’s payoff what player j contributes to player i’s payoff.” (Winter, 2002). Note that in this case
payoffs refer to players’ values, and therefore the original property is a particular case of G-CBC
for C = ∅.
G-SPB is related to the neutrality to strategic risk property considered by Roth (1977) to char-
acterize the Shapley value as a utility function. Let % be a preference relation over games and
positions, where an element (v, i) ∈ GN × N represents the position i ∈ N in the game v ∈ GN
that the decision maker is evaluating (and comparing with other positions and other games). In
this setting, Roth distinguishes between two kinds of risks: ordinary risk, involving the uncertainty
which arises from the chance mechanism involved in lotteries; and strategic risk, that involves the
uncertainty which arises from the interaction in a game of the strategic players.3 Roth (1977) states
that a preference relation % is neutral to strategic risk if (uS, i) ∼ (
1
su{i}, i), where ∼ stands for the
indifference relation, for all unanimity games uS (seen as pure bargaining games). That is, the cer-
tainty equivalent of playing uS in position i should be to receive
1
s for sure. In our case, G-SPB can
be seen as a restriction of the original neutrality to strategic risk property in the sense that it is only
imposed for pure bargaining games over the grand coalition N (see Remark 2 after Theorem 2).
It is worthy to remark that G-SPB leads to regard each group as one representative, independent
of the number of original players it is composed of, when all players are strictly necessary. In
a voting game in which the vote of all players is needed in order to pass a bill, all of them are
equally powerful regardless of the number of seats they originally have.
Theorem 1. The Shapley group value φg satisfies all properties P1 to P13.
Proof. Let us arbitrarily fix the sets C and N, C ⊂ N ∈ N , and let v ∈ GN . Since for every
i ∈ N, φg(i;N, v) coincides with the Shapley value φi(N, v) and φ
g(N; v,N) := φn(NN, vN),
which equals v(N), property G-coherence P1 is a consequence of the Shapley value’s efficiency.
To check properties P2 to P5, and P8 to P13, we use the following common scheme. i) To note
that φg(C;N, v) is the Shapley value of the proxy player c in (NC, vC); ii) to analyze the implica-
tions of the considered property in terms of the merging game (NC, vC) and its (individual) Shap-
ley value; and iii) to rely on the Shapley value properties to conclude the proof. For instance, the
G-null player property is clear because i) φg(C ∪ i;N, v) is the Shapley value of the proxy player
c′ ≡ C ∪ i in (NC∪i, vC∪i); ii) since all the marginal contributions of i are zero, the merging game
(NC∪i, vC∪i) coincides with the game (NC \ i, vC|NC\i) identifying c
′ ≡ c. Note also that i is a
null player in (NC, vC). Then, iii) φ
g(C ∪ i;N, v) := φc′(NC∪i, vC∪i) = φc(NC, vC) =: φ
g(C;N, v)
because the Shapley value verifies the null player out property (Derks and Haller, 1999).
With respect to property P6, G-CBC, let C ⊂ N ∈ N be any two finite sets, and let v any game
in GN . First let us remark that condition (3) is equivalent to:
ξg(C ∪ i;N, v)− ξg(C ∪ j;N, v) =
(ξg(C ∪ i;N\j, v−j)− ξ
g(C;N\j, v−j))− (ξ
g(C ∪ j;N\i, v−i)− ξ
g(C;N\i, v−i)). (4)
3Roth (1977) only considers as strategic players those who are not null.
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Also note that, by definition of the merging game and the Shapley value, for any i, j ∈ N \ C the
following equalities hold:
φg(C ∪ i;N, v) = ∑
S⊂N\C
i,j/∈S
( s!(n− c− s− 1)!
(n− c)!
(v(S ∪ C ∪ i)− v(S))+
(s+ 1)!(n− c− s− 2)!
(n− c)!
(v(S∪ C ∪ i ∪ j)− v(S ∪ j))
)
,
φg(C;N\j, v−j) = ∑
S⊂N\C
i,j/∈S
( s!(n− c− s− 1)!
(n− c)!
(v(S∪ C)− v(S))+
(s+ 1)!(n− c− s− 2)!
(n− c)!
(v(S∪ C ∪ i)− v(S ∪ i))
)
,
φg(C ∪ j;N\i, v−i) = ∑
S⊂N\C
i,j/∈S
s!(n− c− s− 2)!
(n− c− 1)!
(v(S ∪ C ∪ j)− v(S)).
Analogous expressions hold for φg(C ∪ j;N, v), φg(C;N \ i, v−i) and φ
g(C ∪ i;N \ j, v−j). Now it
is enough to check that for every S ∈ N with i, j /∈ S the coefficients of v(S∪C∪ i∪ j), v(S∪C∪ i),
v(S∪ C ∪ j), v(S ∪ C), v(S ∪ i), v(S ∪ j) and v(S) are the same in both sides of the equation in (4),
and this is easily deduced from the previous expressions. We leave the details to the reader.
It remains property P7, G-SPB. Consider the unanimity game with respect to the grand coali-
tion (N, uN), and a non-empty group C ⊂ N ∈ N . It is straightforward to see that the merging
game (NC, (uN)C) is the unanimity game (NC, uNC) with respect to the grand coalition NC, so
φg(C;N, uN) := φc(NC, (uN)C) =
1
n−c+1 , as desired.
Next, we give our characterization of the Shapley group value. It must be remarked that it is
not a trivial extension of a characterization of the Shapley value, since we do not impose any con-
dition about the value of the individual agents out of the group Cwe are evaluating. In particular,
we have been forced to use in the same characterization group linearity and group coalitional bal-
anced contributions properties. Thus, we should carefully check that all the considered properties
are necessary to guarantee the uniqueness of the group value φg (see the Appendix).
Theorem 2. The unique group value over the set of all games G verifying G-null player, G-linearity,
G-CBC, and G-SPB (P3, P5, P6 and P7, respectively) is the Shapley group value φg.
Proof. We have proved that the properties hold for the Shapley group value, so we are left with
the question of uniqueness.
Since {(N, uS)}S⊂N
S 6=∅
forms a basis of GN for all N ∈ N , by G-linearity it is sufficient to con-
sider the games (N, uS), ∅ 6= S ⊂ N ∈ N . So let us see that ξ
g(C;N, uS) = φ
g(C;N, uS) :=
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φc(NC, (uS)C) for all non-empty subsets C, S ⊂ N ∈ N . When C = ∅, this equality trivially holds
by definition of a group value.
The proof will consist in a double induction over the cardinality of the player set N (first
induction) and the cardinality of the unanimous coalition S ⊂ N (second induction).
First, we will prove that ξg(C;N, uS) = φ
g(C;N, uS) for all non-empty subsets C, S ⊂ N
whenever the cardinality of N ∈ N is n ≤ 2. For the unanimity game ({i}, ui) with just one
player i ≡ N, G-SPB property P7 implies that ξg(i;N, ui) = 1 = φ
g(i;N, ui). Now, let (N, uS)
be a two-person unanimity game with N = {i, j}. For the unanimity game uN , P7 implies that
ξg({i, j};N, uN) = φ
g({i, j};N, uN). For the unanimity game (N, ui), G-null player P3 implies:
ξg(j;N, ui) = ξ
g(∅;N, ui) := 0 and ξ
g(i;N, ui) = ξ
g({i, j};N, ui), (5)
Now, G-CBC property P6 implies
ξg(i;N, ui)− ξ
g(j;N, ui) = (ξ
g(i; {i}, ui)− ξ
g(∅; {i}, ui)− (ξ
g(j; {j}, u0)− ξg(∅; {j}, u0)),
= 1− 0− 0+ 0,
where ξg(i;N, ui) = 0 for the trivial game ({i}, u
0) with u0(i) = 0, follows from P3. Therefore,
taking into account (5), ξg(·; {i, j}, ui) ≡ φ
g(·; {i, j}, ui) holds. The same reasoning applies to
(N, uj).
Let us fix a player set N ∈ N with |N| = r, and consider the unanimity game (N, uS) for a
fix set ∅ 6= S ⊂ N. We will prove that ξg(C;N, uS) = φ
g(C;N, uS) for all C ⊂ N. Two cases are
possible:
(i) If S = N, then G-SPB implies ξg(C;N, uN) = φ
g(C;N, uN) for any non-empty group C in
N.
(ii) Otherwise, if ∅ 6= S ( N, we proceed by induction on the cardinality of C. Let us first prove
the individual case C = {i}.
There is at least a player j ∈ N\S which by definition of unanimity game must be null. Let i
be a player in S. Again by G-CBC, taking C = ∅, we obtain ξg(i;N, uS) = ξ
g(i;N\j, uS|N\j),
since G-null player implies ξg(j;N, uS) = ξ
g(∅;N, uS) = 0, and taking into account that
uS|N\i ≡ u
0 ∈ GN\i.
Now, we may assume by the first induction that for every unanimity game (N′, uS|N′)
with N′ ( N we have ξg(C;N′, uS|N′) = φ
g(C;N′, uS|N′) for any group C in N
′. Thus,
ξg(i;N\j, uS|N\j) = φ
g(i;N\j, uS|N\j), which in turn is equal to
1
s by definition, and then
ξg(i;N, uS) =
1
s = φi(N, uS) = φ
g(i;N, uS). Note that every i /∈ S is a null player in uS
and therefore G-null player implies ξg(i;N, uS) = 0 = φ
g(i;N, uS). So we are done with the
individual case C = {i}.
Now, in order to prove ξg(C;N, uS) = φ
g(C;N, uS) for all groups C with c > 1, we proceed
by induction on the cardinality of C (second induction). So we take now 1 < r′ ≤ r, and we
may assume that ξg(C;N, uS) = φ
g(C;N, uS) holds for any C ⊂ N with |C| < r
′. We will
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check that ξg(D;N, uS) = φ
g(D;N, uS) for all D ⊂ N with |D| = r
′.
Let D be a fixed subset of N of cardinality r′. Since S  N, again there is a null player j in
uS. So, if j ∈ D, then D \ j is a coalition of cardinal r
′ − 1 and, thus, G-null player and the
second induction hypothesis imply
ξg(D;N, uS) = ξ
g(D\j;N, uS) = φ
g(D\j;N, uS) = φ
g(D;N, uS).
Otherwise, if D does not contain any null player, then let i be a player in D ⊂ S. By the
second induction hypothesis and G-null player property it holds
ξg((D\i) ∪ j;N, uS) = ξ
g((D\i);N, uS) = φ
g((D\i);N, uS) = φ
g((D\i)∪ j;N, uS).
Note also that ξg(C;N\i, uS|N\i)) = 0 = φ
g(C;N\i, uS|N\i)) for all C ⊂ N, since uS|N\i ≡
u0 ∈ GN\i. Hence, by G-CBC, taking C = D\i, and the first induction,
ξg(D;N, uS)− φ
g((D\i)∪ j;N, uS) = (φ
g(D;N\j, uS|N\j)− φ
g(D\i;N\j, uS|N\j))−
(φg((D\i) ∪ j;N\i, uS|N\i)− φ
g(D\i;N\i, uS|N\i)) = φ
g(D;N, uS)− φ
g((D\i) ∪ j;N, uS).
So we have proved the uniqueness for the unanimity games (N, uS) for all S ⊂ N ∈ N and we
are done.
Remark 1. As we commented before, G-SPB leads players to act as one representative in pure
bargaining games when all players are strictly necessary, and this combined with G-null player
and G-CBC, lead to the same strategic behavior in all pure bargaining games (N, uS), S ⊂ N. In
fact, assume we replace the certainty equivalent in G-SPB as follows:
ξg(C;N, uN) =
c
n
, for every non-empty group C ⊂ N ∈ N . (6)
Then, condition (6), G-null player, G-linearity and G-CBC characterize the additive group value
Aφg defined as the sum of the individual Shapley values of the involved players, whereAφg(C;N, v) :=
∑i∈C φi(N, v), for every C ⊂ N and for all N ∈ N .
We conclude from the previous remark that in case we want to use a group valuation with the
Shapley value standards that accounts for the synergy among group members, then we must use
the Shapley group value we define.
Remark 2. Note also that if we strengthen G-SPB imposing the certainty equivalent of playing
every pure bargaining game (N, uS), for all S ⊂ N ∈ N , as follows (C, uS) ∼ (c,
1
|S\C|+1uc),
for every group C such that S ∩ C 6= ∅, then the Shapley group value can be characterized by
neutrality to both kind of risks: ordinary and strategic.
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4 Profitability of a group
In Section 3 we have proposed a method to measure the a priori value of a group and we have
characterized it axiomatically. In this section we rely on this valuation to analyze the profitability
of a group.
Next proposition shows that supperadditivity implies that the expected value of group C is at
least the value that their members can assure for themselves. Moreover, if the game is monotonic
larger groups are more valuable.
We also analyze when the integration of group C is mergeable in the sense of Derks and Tijs
(2000). We end up this section studying the marginal effect that the incorporation of a new mem-
ber has over an already integrated group. Theorem 3 relates this marginal effect with a measure
of average complementarity between the entrant player and the incumbent group.
Proposition 1. Let N ∈ N be any finite set of players, and v be any game in GN . Then, the Shapley group
value φg verifies the following properties:
(i) Group Rationality: φg(C;N, v) ≥ v(C) for every C ⊂ N ∈ N if the game v ∈ GN is superaddi-
tive, and
(ii) Monotonicity: φg(C;N, v) ≤ φg(D;N, v) for every pair of coalitions C ⊂ D ⊂ N ∈ N if the
game v ∈ GN is monotonic.
Proof. Group rationality follows from the individual rationality of the Shapley value. Note that
every merging game (NC, vC), C ⊂ N, is superadditive if it is (N, v), for all C ⊂ N ∈ N and
v ∈ GN .
Monotonicity follows from being
φg(C ∪ i;N, v)− φg(C;N, v) = ∑
S⊂N\C
i/∈S
s!(n− c− s)!
(n− c+ 1)!
(
v(S ∪ i ∪ C)− v(S ∪ C)
)
+
(s+ 1)!(n− c− s− 1)!
(n− c+ 1)!
(
v(S ∪ i)− v(S)
)
≥ 0, (7)
for all coalitions C ⊂ N ∈ N , and all players i /∈ C, whenever the game v is monotonic.
Nowwe will examine the profitability of the integration of group Cmeasured as the difference
between the Shapley value of group C, which represents its a priori valuation when they act as
one representative, and the sum of the individual Shapley values of the involved players (the
additive Shapley group value of C), i.e.
φg(C;N, v)− ∑
i∈C
φi(N, v).
Profitability is analyzed by Derks and Tijs (2000), and also by Segal (2003). Next, we recall the
general results they obtained.
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Proposition 2 (Derks and Tijs, 2000). Let N ∈ N be any finite set of players, and v be any game in GN .
Then, coalition C ⊂ N ∈ N is profitable4 whenever all coalitions with positive Harsanyi dividend are
either contained in C or have at most one player in common with C.
Derks and Tijs also propose some interesting types of games for which every coalition is prof-
itable, or profitability can be guaranteed for certain kinds of coalitions.
The results of Segal (2003) rely on the second-order difference operator for a pair of players i, j ∈
N, and the third-order difference operator for three players i, j, k ∈ N.
The second-order difference operator for a pair of players i, j ∈ N is defined as a composition of
marginal contribution operators (i.e., first-order difference operators) as follows:
∆2ij(S;N, v) = v(S ∪ {i, j})− v(S ∪ j)− v(S∪ i) + v(S), ∀ S ⊂ N \ {i, j}.
Here ∆2ij(S;N, v) expresses player i’s effect over the marginal contribution of player j (or vice
versa). Note that v(S∪{i, j})− v(S) = ∆2ij(S;N, v)+∆i(S;N, v)+∆j(S;N, v), and thus ∆
2
ij(S;N, v) >
0 implies that the marginal contribution of players i, j as a group exceeds the sum of the individual
marginal contributions of each player.
In fact, following Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985), players i and j are said to be
strategic complements whenever ∆2ij(S;N, v) ≥ 0, for all S ⊂ N \ {i, j}. They are said to be strate-
gic substitutes whenever ∆2ij(S;N, v) ≤ 0, for all S ⊂ N \ {i, j}. Therefore, ∆
2
ij(S;N, v) can be
interpreted as a measure of players i and j interaction with respect to the players in S.
Analogously, the third-order difference operator for players i, j, k ∈ N is defined as ∆3ijk(·;N, v) =
∆i(∆
2
jk(·;N, v)), for all S ⊂ N \ {i, j, k}. Here ∆
3
ijk(S;N, v) expresses player k’s effect over the
complementarity between players i and j with respect to the players in S. Again, the operator
does not depend on the order of taking differences.
Segal (2003) obtains the following result about profitability of groups of two players5, showing
that the merging of two players i, j ∈ N is profitable (unprofitable) whenever the presence of
the outside players reduces (increases) the complementarity between the colluding players. This
author also takes into account the profitability of the incorporation of a new member j ∈ N \ C
to an already integrated group C (point (ii) in next Proposition 3). In this case, profitability is
measured with respect to the situation in which the players of group C are colluding. That is,
profitability means
φg(C ∪ j;N, v) ≥ φg(C;N, v) + φj(NC, vC). (8)
Proposition 3 (Segal, 2003). Let N ∈ N be any finite set of players, and v be any game in GN . Then:
(i) A coalition C = {i, j} ⊂ N of two players is profitable (unprofitable) if ∆3ijk(S;N, v) ≤ (≥) 0,
for every coalition S ⊂ N \ {i, j, k}, and for all k ∈ N \ C. If the reverse inequalities hold, then
group C is unprofitable.
4Actually, Derks and Tijs (2000) refer to profitability as mergeability.
5Note that the kind of group integration we work with is equivalent to the collusive contracts considered by Segal
(2003).
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(ii) The union of the integrated group C ⊂ N and player j /∈ C is profitable (unprofitable) if ∆3ijk(S;N, v) ≤
(≥) 0, for every coalition S ⊂ N \ {i, j, k}, and for all i ∈ C, k ∈ N \ (C ∪ i).
Condition (i) above states that profitability of the merging of players i and j is not directly
related with their own complementarity. In fact, if we analyze the games with indispensable players
application of Segal (2003) that models for instance the case of a firm that is indispensable to
its workers, it holds that the union of two substitutable workers is profitable if their bargaining
opponents (the remaining workers) enhances their substitutability. With respect to the union
of the firm p and one of the workers d, which are always strategic complements, this union is
profitable (unprofitable) if worker d is a strategic substitute (complement) of the rest of workers.
According to Segal’s results it is clear that complementarity and substitutability are not di-
rectly related to profitability. However, Theorem 3 below shows how the Shapley group value
incorporates those kind of relations among the players when evaluating the value of a group.
The marginal contribution of a new entrant j to the incumbent group C is the sum of the a priori
value of player j which does not depend on C, and the average complementarity between j and C.
Formally:
Definition 2. Let N ∈ N be any finite set of players, and v be any game in GN , the average
complementarity of players i, j ∈ N is defined as the following average of second-order differences:
ψij(N, v) := ∑
S⊂N\{i,j}
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
∆2ij(S;N, v), for all i 6= j ∈ N. (9)
The average ψij(N, v) is taken over all the possible orders of N = {1, . . . , n}, when all orders
are considered equally probable. The second-order difference ∆2ij(S;N, v) is considered in all
orders in which coalition S contains all players arriving between i and j, and i comes before j. It
can be interpreted as an interaction index in the sense of Grabisch and Roubens (1999).
Theorem 3. Let N ∈ N be any finite set of players, and v be any game in GN . Let C ⊂ N be any group
in N, and let i /∈ C. Then, the marginal contribution of player i ∈ N \ C to the Shapley group value of
C equals:
MC
g
i (C;N, v) := φ
g(C ∪ i;N, v)− φg(C;N, v) = φi(N \ C, v|N\C) + ψci(NC, vC). (10)
Proof. Let us arbitrarily fix the sets C and N and the player i, C ( N ∈ N , i ∈ N \ C, and let
v ∈ GN . Then, adding and subtracting the amount
∑
S⊂N\C
i/∈S
s!(n− c− s− 1)!
(n− c)!
(
v(S∪ i)− v(S)
)
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to the above expression (7) of the marginal contribution MC
g
i (C;N, v) follows that:
MC
g
i (C;N, v) = ∑
S⊂N\C
i/∈S
s!(n− c− s− 1)!
(n− c)!
(
v(S∪ i)− v(S)
)
+
∑
S⊂N\C
i/∈S
s!(n− c− s)!
(n− c+ 1)!
(
v(S∪ i ∪ C)− v(S ∪ C)− v(S∪ i) + v(S)
)
.
The first term is precisely the Shapley value of player i in the restricted game (N \C, v|N\C), where
players in C do not play a role. The second term can be expressed by means of the second-order
difference operators for the pair of players i, c ∈ NC, as follows:
∑
S⊂N\C
i/∈S
s!(n− c− s)!
(n− c+ 1)!
(
v(S∪ i ∪ C)− v(S ∪ C)− v(S ∪ i) + v(S)
)
=
∑
S⊂N\C
i/∈S
s!(n− c− s)!
(n− c+ 1)!
∆2ic(S;NC, vC) =: ψci(NC, vC).
The previous result shows that the value of a group results from a complex combination of
independence and complementarity among its members. In particular, it is clear that the most
valuable k agents from an individual point of view do not form in general the most valuable
group of k agents. Let us illustrate this fact with the following simple example.
Example 1. Let us consider the following social network represented in Figure 1 as an undirected
graph (N, Γ), and the connectivity game (Amer and Gimenez, 2004), which is defined as
v(S) =


1, if S is connected in Γ and |S| > 1,
0, otherwise,
, for all S ⊂ N.
Figure 1: Social Network (N, Γ)
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Here, S ⊂ N is a connected coalition in (N, Γ) if for every two players i 6= j in S, {i, j} ∈ Γ, or
there exists a path between them which consists of nodes in S. That is, there exists a sequence of
nodes and edges pi(i, j) = {i = i1, i2, . . . , ik−1, ik = j}, with k ≥ 2 satisfying the property that for
all 1 ≤ r ≤ k− 1, {ir , ir+1} ∈ Γ, and ir ∈ S, for all 2 ≤ r ≤ k− 1.
In that case, the two more valuable players, according to their individual Shapley values are
the two centers of the satellite stars, players 4 and 6. φi(N, v) = −
8
360 , for all the leaves i =
1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, φ4(N, v) = φ6(N, v) =
139
360 , for the two centers, and φ5(N, v) =
130
360 for the hub which
intermediates between players 4 and 6. However, the most valuable group of two agents is the
one composed by the hub and one out of the two centers. In fact,
φg({4, 6};N, v) = φ4(N, v) + φ6(N \ 4, v|(N \ 4)) + ψ46(N, v) =
139
360
+
1
8
−
1
90
=
1
2
,
φg({4, 5};N, v) = φ4(N, v) + φ5(N \ 4, v|(N \ 4)) + ψ45(N, v) =
139
360
+
1
56
+
19
72
=
1
2
+
47
280
.
The result of this computation can be interpreted in the following lines: although the power of
player 5 depends more on the presence of player 4 than the power of 6, the average complemen-
tarity of players 4 and 5 is greater than the average complementarity of players 4 and 6. ✷
5 Application: Detecting a target group in terrorist networks
We will illustrate now the application of the Shapley group value to the two terrorist networks
which have been considered by Lindelauf et al. (2013): the operational network of Jemaah Is-
lamiyah’s Bali bombing and the network of hijackers of Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attack.
For the first case, Jemaah Islamiyah’s Bali bombing attack, the authors use the game (N, vwconn).
Let (N, Γ) be the undirected graph which represents the terrorist network. The nodes in the finite
set N = {1, . . . , n} are the terrorists, whereas the edges -i.e., unordered pairs of distinct nodes-
represent the known relationships between the terrorists. In Figure 2 the terrorist network we
work with is represented.
Then, Lindelauf et al. (2013) define the game (N, vwconn), which extends the connectivity game
of Amer andGimenez (2004) using information about relationships. In that game, a coalitionmust
be connected in order to achieve a non-zero value. That is, players in coalition S must rely only
upon their own connections in order to communicate among themselves. Then, since a terrorist
cell tries to prevent discovery during the planning and execution phase of an attack, and taking
into account the available data about the existing relationships6, the authors define the power of
a coalition as the total number of relationships that exist within that coalition divided by the sum
6The authors collected the strength of existing relationships from Koschade (2006).
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Figure 2: Operational network of JI’s Bali attack. Image taken from Lindelauf et al. (2013)
of the weights (representing frequency and duration of interaction) on those relationships;
vwconn(S) =


∑i,j∈S
i 6=j
Iij
∑i,j∈S
i 6=j
f ij
, if S is connected in Γ and |S| > 1,
0, otherwise,
, for all S ⊂ N, (11)
where fij is the weight assigned to relation {i, j} ∈ Γ in the terrorist network, Iij = 1, for every
edge {i, j} in Γ, and 0 otherwise.
We obtain the following results concerning groups from one to four individuals. Following
Castro, Gomez and Tejada (2009), and taking into account that the marginal contributions in the
extended connectivity games are computable in polynomial time, we have estimated with Monte
Carlo simulation the Shapley group value of the examples, also in polynomial time. The results
obtained are represented in Table 1, which includes the records for the best groups arranged in
decreasing order of importance.
Individuals Two agents Three agents Four agents
Samudra, 0, 358 {Samudra, Muklas}, 0, 453 {Samudra, Muklas,Azahari}, 0, 442 {Samudra, Muklas,Feri,Azahari}, 0, 466
Muklas, 0, 048 {Samudra, Azahari}, 0, 392 {Samudra, Muklas,Sarijo}, 0, 435 {Samudra, Muklas,Feri,Sarijo}, 0, 460
Feri, 0, 032 {Samudra, Sarijo}, 0, 386 {Samudra, Muklas,Patek}, 0, 435 {Samudra, Muklas,Feri,Patek}, 0, 460
Azahari, 0, 012 {Samudra, Patek}, 0, 386 {Samudra, Feri,Azahari}, 0, 430 {Samudra, Muklas,Feri,Ghoni}, 0, 453
Sarijo, 0, 005 {Samudra, Rauf}, 0, 384 {Samudra, Muklas,Ghoni}, 0, 429 {Samudra, Muklas,Azahari,Sarijo}, 0, 429
Table 1: Operational network of JI’s Bali attack rankings
According to the individual rankings for the JI network based on the Shapley value, the five
most valuable terrorists were, in decreasing order of importance: Samudra, Muklas, Feri, Azahari
and Sarijo.
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With respect of groups of two terrorists, the most valuable group is that composed by the
two more important agents, {Samudra, Muklas}. However, the second group of size two in im-
portance is {Samudra, Azahari}, improving the group value of {Samudra, Feri}, which equals
0, 350, and takes the 15th place. In fact, Samudra has all direct contacts has Feri, and therefore
Feri’s presence in a group is somehow redundant if Samudra is already in it. According to what
it is known about the attack, ”Samudra, an engineering graduate, played a key role in the bombings”,
whereas Azahari is the bomb expert who was considered the ”brain” behind the entire operation.
Again, the most valuable group of three terrorist is {Samudra, Muklas,Azahari}. However,
when considering a bigger group of four terrorist, then {Samudra, Muklas, Feri, Azahari} has
the highest Shapley group value.
In the analysis of the terrorist network of the 11S, Lindelauf et al.’s starting point was the
version of the network in Figure 3, whose links come from terrorists that lived or learned together
(black edges) as well as some temporary links that were only activated just before the attack in
order to coordinate the cells. See Krebs (2002) for further information. The authors use the game
(N, vwconn2), which uses information about the individuals:
vwconn2(S) =


∑
i∈S
wi, if S is connected in Γ and |S| > 1,
0, otherwise,
, for all S ⊂ N, (12)
wherewi is theweight assigned to terrorist i ∈ N. The authors also determine the terrorist weights
in their analysis (see Table 5 in Lindelauf et al., 2013).
Figure 3: 11S Social Network. Image taken from V.E. Krebs (Copyright c©2002, First Monday)
The results obtained bymeans of Monte carlo simulation (see Castro, Gomez and Tejada, 2009)
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are depicted in Table 2, which includes the records for the best groups arranged in decreasing
order of importance.
Individuals Two agents Three agents
A. Aziz Al-Omari (WTC-N), 6, 096 {Al-Omari, Al-Ghamdi}, 7, 405 {Al-Omari, H. Hanjour, M. Al-Sehhi}, 9, 236
H. Al-Ghamdi (WTC-S), 5, 578 {Al-Omari, M. Al-Sehhi}, 7, 392 {Al-Omari, H. Al-Ghamdi, Wd. Al-Shehri}, 9, 153
Wd. Al-Shehri (WTC-N), 5, 563 {Al-Omari, H. Hanjour}, 7, 368 {M. Al-Shehhi, H. Al-Ghamdi, Wd. Al-Shehri}, 9, 140
H. Hanjour (Pent), 5, 402 { Aziz Al-Omari, Wd. Al-Shehri}, 7, 324 {H. Al-Ghamdi, Wd. Al-Shehri, H. Hanjour}, 9, 074
M. Al-Shehhi (WTC-S), 2, 202 {Al-Omari, M. Atta}, 7, 156 {H. Al-Ghamdi, H. Hanjour, N. Al-Hazmi}, 8, 986
M. Atta (WTC-North), 1, 600 {H. Al-Ghamdi, H. Hanjour}, 7, 044 { Al-Omari, H. Al-Ghamdi, H. Hanjour}, 8, 963
Table 2: 11S-hijackers network rankings
According to the individual rankings for the Al Qaeda’s 9/11 network based on the Shapley
value, the most valuable terrorists were, in decreasing order of importance: A. Aziz Al-Omari
(WTC North cell), H. Al-Ghamdi (WTC South cell), Wd. Al-Shehri (WTC North cell), H. Hanjour
(Pentagon cell), M. Al-Shehhi (WTC South cell) and M. Atta (WTC North cell).
With respect of groups of two terrorists, the most valuable group is that composed by the
two more important agents, {A. Aziz Al-Omari, Al-Ghamdi}. However, the second group of
size two in importance is {Aziz Al-Omari, M. Al-Sehhi}, improving the group value of {Aziz Al-
Omari, Wd. Al-Shehri}, which takes the 4th place. In fact, Wd. Al-Shehri is one out of the three
hijackers that crashed the plane into WTC South which forms a cycle in the terrorist network that
is connected to the rest of terrorist only via A. Aziz Al-Omari, who also belongs to theWTCNorth
cell. Thus, Wd. Al-Shehri presence in a group is not so necessary if A. Aziz Al-Omari is already
in it.
The most valuable group of three terrorist is {A. Aziz Al-Omari, H. Hanjour, M. Al-Sehhi}.
In that case, Wd. Al-Shehri, from WTC North cell, and H. Al-Ghamdi, from WTC South cell, are
displaced. Now, H. Hanjour, who is known to be the leader of WTC South cell, has displaced H.
Al-Ghamdi.
When considering a bigger group of four terrorist, then {A. Aziz Al-Omari, H. Hanjour, M.
Al-Sehhi, Wd. Al-Shehri} has the highest Shapley group value. The first group with one repre-
sentative per each cell occupies the 13th place, with a Shapley group value of φg(D;N,wconn2) =
10, 6311, being {A. Aziz Al-Omari, H. Hanjour, M. Al-Sehhi, Z. Jarrah}. Note that Z. Jarrah, who
is known to be the leader of Pennsylvania cell is individually in the 8th position. The group of the
four cell’s leaders L = {M. Atta, H. Hanjour, M. Al-Sehhi, Z. Jarrah} is in the 48th position with
a group value of φg(L;N,wconn2) = 9, 1313.
Recall that Lindelauf et al. (2013) carried out the analysis on the terrorist network of the nine-
teen hijackers which prepared and executed the attack (distributed in four cells). We extend their
analysis to a more dense network (see Figure 4) which included some people which did not take
direct part in the attack, but support the terrorists. In this event, the relative positions of the hi-
jackers change: the two poor connected terrorists from the WTC North cell, A. Aziz Al-Omari
and Wd. Al-Shehri, are not so relevant in the new network, since they are now better connected
through non-hijackers terrorists. According to the rankings for the Al Qaeda’s 9/11 hijackers
based on the individual Shapley value and the extended network7, the most valuable hijack-
7In which we have again considered the wconn2 game, with a zero weight for all the terrorists who do not take direct
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ers were, in decreasing order of importance, N. Al-Hazmi (Pentagon), H. Hanjour (Pentagon),
M. Atta (WTC North), H. Al-Ghamdi (WTC South), Wd. Al-Shehri (WTC North) and Z. Jarrah
(Pennsylvania).
Figure 4: 11S extended SN. Image taken from V.E. Krebs (Copyright c©2002, First Monday)
The results obtained bymeans of Monte carlo simulation (see Castro, Gomez and Tejada, 2009)
are depicted in Table 3, which includes the records for the best groups arranged in decreasing
order of importance.
Individuals Two agents
N. Al-Hazmi (Pent), 6, 132 {N. Al-Hazmi, M. Atta}, 8, 424
H. Hanjour (Pent), 6, 089 { N. Al-Hazmi, H. Hanjour}, 8, 342
M. Atta (WTC-N), 5, 926 { H. Hanjour, M. Atta}, 8, 152
H. Al-Ghamdi (WTC-S), 1, 844 {N. Al-Hazmi, H. Al-Ghamdi}, 7, 201
Wd. Al-Shehri (WTC-N), 1, 701 {H. Hanjour, Z. Jarrah}, 7, 048
Z. Jarrah (Penn), 1, 688 {M. Atta, Z. Jarrah}, 7, 013
Table 3: 11S extended network rankings
With respect to groups of two terrorists, the most valuable group is {N. Al-Hazmi, M. Atta},
which does not coincide with the two more important terrorists’ group. In that case, however,
part in the attacks.
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the three and four people most valuable 3-group and 4-group are composed of the three and four,
respectively, most important hijackers from an individual point of view. Those groups, C3 and C4,
have group values of φg(C3;N ∪M,w
conn2) = 10, 675 and φg(C4;N ∪M,w
conn2) = 12, 529. Now,
the group L is in the twentieth position with a value of φg(L;N ∪M,wconn2) = 10, 066.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced an extension of the classical game-theoretic concept of value to
the framework of groups. We define the group value as a vector whose components measure the
expectations of the coalition inside a game, i.e. an evaluation of the prospects of the group if they
act together as an individual; in this sense, the group value must be understood as a valuation
vector. A key observation in our proposal is that we do not need to suppose necessarily that the
agents know each other nor agree to act jointly; instead, we assume the existence of an external
decision maker that is able and willing to evaluate the value of the different groups, and in his
case, find the optimal group who undertakes the appropriate collective action he is trying to
promote. For instance, to find the group of a given size k with the largest Shapley group value.
The main motivation of our work and in particular of the previous definitions was to obtain
a (marginalistic) extension of the Shapley value to the context of groups. Following the original
formulation of Shapley, who intended to apply his value to measure the expectations of players
in a game, and also keeping in mind the mentioned idea of the external decision maker, we have
performed the generalization of the Shapley value by means of the merging game defined by
Derks and Tijs in 2000. In this work, the authors develop a concept of super-player, who acts as a
proxy in a merging game of all the players of the coalition whose value we do want to compute.
In order to show that our extension of Shapley is valid and interesting, we have proved that
the natural generalizations to the group framework of the usual properties of the (individual)
Shapley value hold for the Shapley group value. Moreover, we offer an axiomatic characteriza-
tion of the Shapley group value which, although includes the group version of null-player and
linearity properties, cannot be directly deduced from the usual characterizations in the individual
context. We analyze the implications of the considered axioms. In particular, G-SPB leads play-
ers to act as one representative in pure bargaining games when all players are strictly necessary,
and this combined with G-null player and G-CBC, lead to the same strategic behavior in all pure
bargaining games (N, uS), S ⊂ N ∈ N . Then, linearity extends this behavior to every game.
Moreover, considering an alternative formulation of G-SPB we characterize an additive Shapley
group valuation. Therefore, we conclude that in case we want to use a group valuation with the
Shapley value standards that accounts for the synergy among group members, then we must use
the Shapley group value we define. It is likely other axiomatic descriptions of the Shapley group
value may exist.
Based on our proposal, and following ideas of Segal, we have elaborated about the ideas of
complementarity and substitutability that concerns to profitability of acting as a group. However,
it is not easy to find a straight relation between complementarity/substitutability and profitability
(or not) because this relation only could be found by means of Segal third derivative, and not
using only the second derivative.
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We finish our paper by testing the validity of our methods in the identification of influent
groups inside a real terrorist network. The flexibility of the proposed approach allows to suppose
that our measure will be effective and usual in a variety of contexts and making use of different
interpretations of the Shapley group value. Let us think for instance in two of them.
In a global economy context, in which many firms present a complex interlocked shareholding
structure, it may be difficult to asses a firm’s controllers. However, “a common intuition among
scholars and in media sees the global economy as being dominated by a handful of powerful transnational
corporation” (Vitali, Glattfelder and Battiston, 2011). In that case, following a game theoretical
approach, we can make use of the Shapley group value to detect a small group of firms which in
fact have a dominating power. The reader is referred to Crama and Leruth (2013) for an interesting
review about this approach.
Another relevant application arises in the context of transportation network’s operation, where
the identification of sets of stations to defense (or maintain) in order to maximally preserve the
network’s operation is a relevant question to network protection against natural and human-
caused hazards, which has become a topical research topic in engineering and social sciences, as
Liu, Fan and Ordon˜ez (2009) point out. In that case, following a game theoretical approach, the
Shapley group value can serve security agencies for selecting a group of stations to defense (or
maintain).
However, it should be remarked that the problem of finding the optimal group, according to
some prearranged criteria, is a combinatorial problem that merits a more careful study. We are
aware of the need of heuristics in order to apply the Shapley group value to the group selection
problem.
Appendix
In the following we should check that all the properties considered in Theorem 2 are necessary to
guarantee the uniqueness of the Shapley group value φg.
G-null player. Let α ∈ (0, 1). Define a group value ξg in the following manner. Let N be any finite
set of players N ∈ N , and let v ∈ GN . If (N, v) is a null game, ξ
g(C;N, v)=0 for every C ∈ N.
Given a non-null unanimity game (N, uS), with S ( N, define ξ
g(C;N, uS) as
ξg(C;N, uS) =


c−1
∑
k=0
αn−k, if C ∩ S = ∅,
1
s− |S ∩ C|+ 1
+
n−s−1
∑
k=0
αn−k, if C ∩ S 6= ∅.
(13)
For S = N, take ξg(C;N, uN) =
1
n−c+1 for all C ⊂ N, and then extend the group value to GN by
linearity. It is clear that ξg(i;N, uS) = α
n
> 0 for all i /∈ S. So, G-null player does not hold. Let us
check that ξg verifies G-CBC over the class of unanimity games. If (N, uN), then G-CBC condition
(4) trivially holds. Let (N, uS) be a unanimity game with S ( N. If |S| = n− 1, then two cases are
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possible:
a) If i, j ∈ S, then ξg(C ∪ i;N, uS) =
1
s−|S∩C|
+ ∑n−s−1k=0 α
n−k = ξg(C ∪ j;N, uS) and (4) holds, since
uS|N\i and uS|N\j are null games.
b) If i ∈ S and j /∈ S, then S = N \ j, uS|N\i ≡ 0 and uS|N\j is a unanimity game w.r.t. the grand
coalition N \ j. Thus (4) holds:
ξg(C ∪ i;N \ j, uN\j|N\j)− ξ
g(C;N \ j, uN\j|N\j) =
1
(n− 1)− (c+ 1) + 1
−
1
(n− 1)− c+ 1
= ξg(C ∪ i;N, uN\j)− ξ
g(C ∪ j;N, uN\j).
If |S| < n− 1, then three cases are possible:
a) If i, j ∈ S, then ξg(C ∪ i;N, uS) =
1
s−|S∩C|
+ ∑n−s−1k=0 α
n−k = ξg(C ∪ j;N, uS) and (4) holds.
b) If i ∈ S and j /∈ S, then
ξg(C ∪ i;N \ j, uS|N\j) =
1
s− |S ∩ C|
+
n−s−1
∑
k=1
αn−k
and
ξg(C;N \ j, uS|N\j) =


c
∑
k=1
αn−k, if C ⊂ N \ S,
1
s− |S ∩ C|+ 1
+
n−s−1
∑
k=1
αn−k, otherwise.
Thus, if C ⊂ N \ S:
ξg(C ∪ i;N \ j, uS|N\j)− ξ
g(C;N \ j, uS|N\j) =
1
s
+
n−s−1
∑
k=1
αn−k −
c
∑
k=1
αn−k = ξg(C ∪ i;N, uS)− ξ
g(C ∪ j;N, uS)
If C ∩ S 6= ∅, then
ξg(C ∪ i;N \ j, uS|N\j)− ξ
g(C;N \ j, uS|N\j) =
1
s− |S ∩ C|
+
n−s−1
∑
k=1
αn−k−
( 1
s− |S ∩ C|+ 1
+
n−s−1
∑
k=1
αn−k
)
= ξg(C ∪ i;N, uS)− ξ
g(C ∪ j;N, uS)
c) If i, j ∈ N \ S, then C ∪ i ⊂ N \ S if, and only if, C ∪ j ⊂ N \ S and, therefore condition (4) can
be easily checked.
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Now, since G-CBC condition is linear ξg satisfies it over
⋃
n≥1 Gn
G-linearity. Let ξg be another group value which is defined in the following way for each N ∈ N ,
and every v ∈ GN .
(A1) If there is at least a null player in N, or (N, v) is the unanimity game with respect to the
grand coalition N, then ξg(C;N, v) = φg(C;N, v) for every group C in N.
(A2) Otherwise, ξ
g(C;N, v) = φg(C;N, v) + k, being k 6= 0 a fixed constant.
It is easily checked that G-null-player and G-SPB hold for ξg. We will check that the property of
coalitional balanced contributions G-BMC also holds for this value. Note that all differences in
(4) match ξg(D; L,w) with ξg(D′; L,w), for some coalition L ∈ {N,N \ i,N \ j} and some game
w ∈ {v, v−i, v−j}.
Taking into account that φg = ξg in case (N, v) is some of the games in the first case (A1), and
in the second one the k′s cancel, it holds:
ξg(C ∪ i;N, v)− ξg(C ∪ j;N, v) = φg(C ∪ i;N, v)− φg(C ∪ j;N, v),
ξg(C ∪ i;N \ j, v−j)− ξ
g(C;N \ j, v−j) = φ
g(C ∪ i;N \ j, v−j)− φ
g(C;N \ j, v−j),
ξg(C ∪ j;N \ i, v−i)− ξ
g(C;N \ i, v−i) = φ
g(C ∪ j;N \ i, v−i)− φ
g(C;N \ i, v−i),
G-CBC property holds for φg, and so the property does so for ξg. Trivially, ξg fails to verify
G-linearity and so we are done.
G-CBC. Define a group value ξg in the following manner. Let N be any finite set of players
N ∈ N , and let v ∈ GN . If (N, v) is a null game, ξ
g(C;N, v)=0 for every C ∈ N. Given a non-null
unanimity game (N, uS) with S ( N, define ξ
g(C;N, uS) as
ξg(C;N, uS) =


0 if C ∩ S = ∅,
1, if S ⊂ C,
|S ∩ C| × |S\C| if C ∩ S 6= ∅ and C ∩ S 6= S,
(14)
ξg(C;N, uN) =
1
n−c+1 , for all C ⊂ N, and then extend the value by linearity to GN .
Observe that all properties but G-CBC hold. The unique one that needs a bit of discussion is
the G-null player property, which holds when considering the base of unanimity games because
in uS the null players are precisely the players outside S, and therefore:
ξg(C ∪ i;N, uS) = 0 = ξ
g(C;N, uS), if S ∩ C = ∅,
ξg(C ∪ i;N, uS) = 1 = ξ
g(C;N, uS), if S ⊂ C, and
ξg(C ∪ i;N, uS) = |S ∩ (C ∪ i)| × |S\(C ∪ i)| = |S ∩ C| × |S\C| = ξ
g(C;N, uS), otherwise,
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for every player i /∈ S. Then, taking into account that the Harsanyi dividend cS(N, v) of any
coalition S containing null players in the game (N, v) equals zero, G-null player property holds
for any v ∈ GN , for all N ∈ N .
Let us check by means of a concrete example that the G-CBC property fails in this case. Con-
sider (N, uS) with N = {1, 2, 3}, and S = {1, 2}. In the notation of the property, take C = {1},
i = 2, and j = 3. Then:
ξg({1, 2};N, uS) = 1, ξ
g({1, 3};N, uS) = 1× 1 = 1,
ξg({1, 2};N\3, uS|N\3) = 1, ξ
g(1;N\3, uS|N\3) = 1/2,
and ξg({1, 3};N\2, uS|N\2) = 0 = ξ
g(1;N\2, uS|N\2), because the game (N\2, uS|N\2) is null. It
is clear now that the two sides of the equalities that define the property do not coincide in this
case.
G-symmetry over pure bargaining games. Consider the additive Shapley value Aφg(C;N, v) :=
∑i∈C φi(N, v). Observe that all properties but G-SPB hold and, clearly, G-SPB fails, so we are
done. ✷
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